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The Importance of Being Earned
HOW ABATEMENT AFTER DEATH COLLATERALLY
HARMS INSURERS, FAMILIES, AND SOCIETY AT
LARGE
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a nine-year-old girl murdered, her father forced
to amputate his leg, and the family faced with nearly one-anda-half million dollars in medical expenses. Now imagine that
the person who caused this harm was convicted and ordered to
pay restitution to the family, but—without any legal review—
the court vacated the conviction and the restitution order.
These are the facts of People v. Schaefer.1
With unreviewed vacations (or abatements) of convictions
come many immediate and ancillary consequences that affect
victims and third parties alike. Courts often issue restitution
orders with criminal convictions to compensate victims for their
losses. In many jurisdictions, when a court abates a conviction
it also abates the corresponding restitution order, which denies
the victim his interest in compensation. These immediately
noticeable effects, however, are not the only problems caused
by abatement. Essentially, when a conviction abates, all proof
of the conviction and its consequences legally disappear,2 which
affects the victim in subsequent civil suits and ripples the
harm to collateral third parties. The absence of a criminal
conviction creates unnecessary obstacles to meeting the burden of
proof in a civil case. This can also create unpredictable results for
insurance settlements related to the criminal conviction. Even
though a defendant has been convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt, and even though in most jurisdictions insurance does not
pay for the wrong-doing of criminals and allows the insurer to
seek indemnification from the wrongdoer through subrogation,
abatement creates the possibility that insurers will have to pay
1
2

People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012).
See infra Part I.C.
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for the consequences of an insured criminal or that the insurance
company’s ability to seek indemnification through subrogation
will be diminished, which takes money out of the pockets of others
insured by the company.
Because there is limited legal guidance on what courts
should do when a criminal dies before exhausting his right to
appeal, the possibility of vacating punishment without review
lurks behind every criminal conviction.3 This includes—but is
not limited to—murder,4 fraud,5 and arson convictions.6
Currently, only one jurisdiction in the United States has
enacted legislation to address this problem.7
There are three basic options of what to do when a
criminal dies before exhausting his right to appeal: (1) abate
the conviction; (2) stay the proceedings (essentially, refuse to
abate or review the conviction outright); and (3) allow for
substitutive appeal. Historically, a large majority of courts abate
the conviction ab initio when a defendant dies before exhausting
8
9
his right to appeal. Abatement ab initio acts to erase all

3

See infra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501 (where the defendant was
convicted of second degree murder and ordered to pay the victim restitution but died
before appealing his conviction).
5
See, e.g., United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870, 875 (2006) (where
the court abated former Enron Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lay’s conviction of
“conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud” among others crimes, when defendant
Lay died before exhausting his right to appeal).
6
See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 411, 418 (5th
Cir. 2004) (where defendant was convicted of arson (among other crimes) and ordered
to pay restitution, and the court abated his conviction because he died before
exhausting his right to appeal).
7
That jurisdiction is the State of Virginia. See Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717
S.E.2d 789, 794 (Va. 2011) (where the court notes in its analysis that “[i]t does not
appear that abatement of a criminal case is addressed by statute in any jurisdiction in
the United States” (citation omitted)); see also Tim A. Thomas, Abatement of State
Criminal Case by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of Conviction—Modern Cases, 80
A.L.R.4th 189 (1990). Further, while the right to appeal is not granted in the
Constitution, all jurisdictions have made post-trial review “an integral part of the
adjudicatory mechanism” and most states grant defendants at least one appeal of right.
See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to A Criminal Appeal, 39
UCLA L. REV. 503, 576 (1992); see also infra Part IV.B (detailing the current status of
abatement). Since the most recent update of the A.L.R., in February 2012, Virginia
enacted a statute that adopted a procedure to follow when defendants die while their
appeals are pending. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
8
See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 760 & n.45 (Alaska 2011); see also
Timothy A. Razel, Note, Dying to Get Away with It: How the Abatement Doctrine Thwarts
Justice—And What Should Be Done Instead, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2196 (2007).
9
Ab initio means “[f]rom the beginning.” BLACK’S L AW DICTIONARY 5
(9th ed. 2009).
4
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10

evidence the conviction ever existed. When a conviction is
abated ab initio, the appellate court “dismiss[es] the appeal as
moot . . . and remand[s] the case to the [trial court] to vacate
11
the judgment and dismiss the indictment.” For the purpose of
this note, the phrase strict abatement ab initio means that all
aspects of the conviction—including restitution orders and any
proceedings leading up to the conviction—are erased when the
defendant dies. Some jurisdictions apply looser forms of
abatement ab initio where only the conviction and the
proceedings leading up to the conviction are abated but the
restitution order is not abated (or other slight variations of the
abatement ab initio doctrine). This is detailed infra in the
Appendix, Table 2. Jurisdictions that apply the abatement
doctrine do so because they view the presumption of innocence
to endure until a final review of the case, and they believe that
anything short of abatement would unjustly harm the
defendant’s family by forcing them to pay for the wrongs of the
deceased defendant.12 While abatement accounts for the
interests of the defendant’s family, it ignores the interests of
the victims, their families, and collateral third parties.13
Simply staying the proceedings and refusing to abate a
conviction is not an adequate solution to the unfairness the
abatement doctrine creates. In a minority of jurisdictions in the
United States, the presumption of innocence is erased at the
moment of conviction. This is detailed infra in the Appendix,
Table 3. The presumption then becomes that the conviction was
proper and the defendant is guilty unless proven otherwise
through appeals.14 Jurisdictions that view the presumption of
innocence this way stay the proceedings (refuse to abate)15
when a defendant dies and do not allow the filing or the
continuance of any appeals; any prosecutorial proceedings that
were initiated before the defendant’s death abate.16 This
practice is as unfair as abating convictions because instead of
10

See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971), overruled in part
by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599 (Wash.
2006); see also Razel, supra note 8, at 2196.
11
United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007).
12
See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2004).
13
See infra Parts II & III.
14
Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Miss. 1994); see also State v.
Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762 (Alaska 2011) (noting that to rely on the presumption of guilt
violates defendants’ rights); infra Part I.B.
15
To stay means “the postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or
the like.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009).
16
See, e.g., Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413.
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harming victims, this practice denies defendants their right to
legal review, forces their families to pay untested restitution
orders, and—like abatement—ignores possible harmful effects
to third parties.17
For the most part, a third doctrine—substitution—can
solve all these problems by allowing interested third parties to
substitute for the defendant in the appeal after his death. This
doctrine, currently recognized in ten states, affords defendants
their right to post-trial review, gives defendants’ families the
opportunity to appeal the conviction and thus the restitution
orders without unjustly forcing them to pay compensation to
anyone, and mitigates the problems caused to third parties in
subsequent civil proceedings.18 This is detailed infra in the
Appendix, Table 4. Substitution also ensures that victims
maintain the possibility of receiving restitution, allows the
record to legally reflect the conviction’s existence for subsequent
civil proceedings (like insurance payments), and mimics what
might have happened if the defendant lived to see his appeal
through.19
This note argues for the application and codification of
the substitution doctrine because of the important and
resounding primary and collateral effects felt by victims,
insurers, families, and society at large when they are forced to
pay for (or denied payment from) an unreviewed conviction. Part
I of this note describes the practices courts most commonly
follow in the case of a defendant’s death before exhausting his
right to appeal, and comments on the different positions courts
take regarding abatement of restitution orders. Part II discusses
problems that arise when a defendant dies while his appeal is
pending and the trial process is stopped prematurely, including
the harms it causes defendants, primary victims, and
governments. For the purpose of this note, the term primary
victims refers to the people who were directly victimized by the
criminal act; primary victims include the person who was
murdered, the person who was raped, the person who was
robbed, etc. Part III of this note discusses the harm premature
adjudication may impose on collateral victims, and specifically
analyzes the effect of abatement on insurance companies and
society at large. For the purpose of this note, the term collateral
victims refers to all parties who are secondarily harmed by the
17
18
19

See infra Parts II & III.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
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judicial proceedings. Collateral victims are the defendant’s
estate, the victim’s family, insurance companies, etc. Part IV
discusses the current state of legislation regarding victims’
rights, the lack of abatement legislation (and its effect on
victims’ rights statutes) and provides a state-by-state, circuitby-circuit overview of each jurisdictions’ current abatement
practices. Part V offers a model substitution statute and
illustrates that allowing an interested third party to substitute
in the appellate proceedings is the only practice that
adequately balances the interests of all parties involved.
Ultimately, this note advocates for legislatures to codify, and
courts to adopt, the practice of substitution when a defendant
dies while his appeal is pending.
I.

ABATEMENT IN AMERICA

In order to understand the fundamental differences
between abatement ab initio, substitution, and refusing to
abate it is simplest to compare the effects with an example. The
following hypothetical was created for the purpose of this note.20
A.

Hypothetical Case and Potential Results

Fred and Wilma, a married couple, have life and
homeowner’s insurance. One day their house catches fire and
Wilma dies in the fire. The police investigate and determine this
was both arson and murder.
A neighbor, Barney, is arrested and convicted of both
crimes. He is sentenced to thirty years in prison and to pay
restitution to Fred for Wilma’s life and the house. Barney
appeals his conviction but dies shortly after the appeal is filed.
1. Hypothetical Results of Abatment
If Barney and Fred live in a jurisdiction that practices
abatement ab initio, Barney (or, rather, his estate) is in luck.21 If
the court were presented with his appeal, it would simply
dismiss the appeal and abate the conviction. In most
jurisdictions, even if Barney did not initiate the appeal the court
would abate his conviction. Barney would be presumed innocent
20

The facts herein are loosely based on multiple cases and their results in
different jurisdictions all discussed elsewhere in this note.
21
Because Barney is dead, it is actually his estate that will benefit.
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because he did not exhaust his right to appeal and a person is
innocent until proven guilty—not just at trial, but by also
failing on all appellate attempts. The record would reflect that
no conviction ever occurred and no subsequent criminal action
could be brought against Barney for these crimes because
Barney is dead. Barney’s estate would not be required to pay
the restitution order for Wilma’s life or Fred’s home. Because it
is possible that his conviction was in error, this result would be
fair to Barney and his estate.
Because Fred and Wilma had house and life insurance,
Fred will be able to file a claim with his insurance company to
recover for his monetary losses. But this means that the cost of
repairs shifts to Fred’s insurer, who will be forced to compensate
Fred for the harm allegedly caused by Barney. Theoretically, the
insurance company could step into Fred’s shoes as subrogee and
pursue Barney’s estate for indemnification of their expenses, but
it could not use proof of Barney’s conviction to shift liability
(because no conviction exists). Without a conviction, if the
insurance company wants to be indemnified it will have a more
difficult time proving that Barney was responsible for the
crime and it will cost more for the insurance company to meet
its burden of proof (where a conviction would essentially speak
for itself). If the indemnification suit is unsuccessful then the
insurance company (and the clients who pay premiums to that
insurance company) lose even more money than just the
compensation to the victim.
2. Hypothetical Results of Staying the Proceedings
If Barney and Fred live in a jurisdiction that refuses to
abate convictions, it is Fred who is in luck (legally, that is).
Following Barney’s conviction, Barney would be presumed guilty
and his death would simply result in the dismissal of his appeal
as moot without any change to his conviction. Fred would
receive payment from Barney’s estate to compensate for the loss
of his wife and home. This is fair to Fred because Barney was, in
fact, convicted for the crimes against Fred and his family.
Unfortunately for Barney (or his estate), this means
that his conviction receives no review. If his conviction were in
error, this can never be proven. Barney’s estate would be forced to
pay the restitution orders to Fred even if Barney was innocent.
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3. Hypothetical Results of Substitution
If Barney and Fred live in a jurisdiction that allows
substitution for posthumous appeals, everyone is in luck (at
least as far as judicial fairness is concerned). Barney’s estate
(or any other eligible third party)22 would be permitted to step
into Barney’s shoes for the purposes of the appeal if they
choose. Even if Barney did not file the appeal before he died, an
eligible third party could choose to bring the appeal. The court
would review the appeal as if Barney were still alive. If the
court were to determine that there was no miscarriage of justice
in Barney’s conviction, then Barney’s conviction and restitution
order would stand and Barney’s estate would pay restitution to
Fred. On the other hand, if the court determines there was a
miscarriage of justice in Barney’s conviction, then the court would
abate Barney’s conviction. Barney’s estate would not be burdened
with paying a restitution order that was issued in error.
B.

The Development of the Abatement Doctrine

The abatement doctrine is born from state and federal
common law, and the lack of statutory codification leaves modern
courts questioning their jurisdictional practices and continually
changing their positions on abatement.23 The dilemma forces
courts to consider whether justice is better served if courts stay
proceedings or abate convictions.24 The varying interests of
parties involved in litigations have called courts to question the
22

Note that the term eligible could vary from state to state. See the proposed
substitution statute set forth in Part V.B. of this note for suggested eligibility guidelines.
23
See, e.g., State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 754 (Alaska 2011) (overruling
Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1967) and holding that substitution must be
permitted after the defendant’s death “[b]ecause of changed conditions, including
increased recognition of the rights of crime victims and rejection of abatement by some
state courts”); State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967 (Haw.), opinion after reinstatement of
appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995) (overruling State v. Gomes, 554 P.2d 235 (Haw.
1976), and holding that substitution must be permitted because “it seem[ed]
unreasonable automatically to follow the abatement ab initio rule and pretend that the
defendant was never indicted, tried, and found guilty”); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130,
135 (Idaho 2005) (overruling State v. Stotter, 175 P.2d (Idaho 1946), and staying the
proceedings because abatement ab initio failed to recognize victims’ rights); State v.
Benn, 274 P.3d 47, 49-50 (Mont. 2012) (overruling State v. Holland, 955 P.2d 164
(Mont. 1998), and staying the proceedings because abatement ab initio failed to
recognize victims’ rights); State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599 (Wash. 2006) (overruling State
v. Furth, 144 P. 907 (Wash. 1914), because abatement ab initio “conflict[ed] with
modern laws that compensate crime victims for their suffering”).
24
See infra note 162; see also Joseph Sauder, Note, How a Criminal
Defendant’s Death Pending Direct Appeal Affects the Victim’s Right to Restitution
Under the Abatement Ab Initio Doctrine, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 347, 360 (1998).
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purpose of criminal law, and the different answers to this
question have shaped the current legal landscape of abatement.25
In recent years, when faced with the issue, courts have
been vocal about their reluctance to adhere to past precedent
but have nonetheless adhered because of a lack of statutory
guidance to do otherwise.26 An increased awareness of victims’
rights has started to show an impact on the approach courts
use when faced with this problem. In the past decades, five
state courts abolished the dated practice of abatement ab initio
by overruling long-standing precedent that requires courts to
apply the doctrine.27 Most courts, however, still choose to
uphold the doctrine of abatement ab initio absent legislation
ordering otherwise.28
C.

Abatement Ab Initio

Abatement ab initio was the first procedure to develop
in the event a defendant died before exhausting his right to
appeal and is the most widely used procedure today.29
Abatement ab initio acts to completely erase “not only the
appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its
inception.”30 When courts strictly follow abatement ab initio,
they vacate all penal, compensatory, and restitutionary aspects
of punishments.31
Abatement ab initio emerged in the early 1900s, from
United States v. Pomeroy.32 In Pomeroy, the defendant was
convicted of violating the Interstate Commerce Act and
sentenced to pay a fine as part of his criminal punishment.33
The defendant died before satisfying the restitution order and
his executrix moved to abate the conviction.34 The court abated
both the conviction and the fine, reasoning that “the object of
25

See infra note 162.
See supra note 23.
27
See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
28
See, e.g., Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011).
29
See id. at 793. Though courts recently have begun to stray from abatement,
it is still the most widely used practice today. For a comprehensive list of states that
strictly apply abatement ab initio see infra Appendix, Table 1. For a detailed list of
states that apply other forms of abatement, see infra Appendix, Table 2.
30
Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971), overruled in part by
Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976).
31
United States v. Morton, 635 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1980).
32
United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev’d sub nom.
United States v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 1908).
33
Id. at 280.
34
Id.
26
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criminal punishment is to punish the criminal, and not to punish
35
his family.” In the years following the Pomeroy decision, nearly
all state and federal courts confronted with this issue adopted the
36
practice of strict abatement ab initio, as did the Supreme Court
37
half a century later in Durham v. United States.
To the extent that abatement applied to writs of
certiorari, however, the Court overruled Durham five years later
38
in Dove v. United States. In Dove, the defendant petitioned the
Court for writ of certiorari and the Court dismissed his petition
because the defendant died before the petition went before the
Court. In the years following the Dove decision, “the federal
circuit courts have concluded that Dove did not abrogate the
abatement doctrine entirely for criminal cases, but only for
39
those cases that had concluded their initial appeals.”
Courts that continue to practice abatement ab initio do
40
so because it protects defendants’ rights and protects
41
defendants’ families from punishment. Today, twelve states,
the District of Columbia, and seven circuit courts apply strict
abatement ab initio.42 Six other states and three other circuit
courts currently apply some other form of the abatement
doctrine when a defendant dies while his appeal is pending.43

35

Id. at 282. But see infra note 162.
See Razel, supra note 8 at 2199-2203.
37
401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (where the Court convicted the defendant for
possession of a counterfeit bill and the defendant died while his appeal was pending),
overruled by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976). The Supreme Court’s decision
to adopt abatement ab initio turned on the lower federal courts’ overwhelming unity in
following Pomeroy. Id.
38
423 U.S. 325.
39
Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 793 (Va. 2011). Note that the right to
appeal criminal convictions is not a right that is embedded in our Constitution, but a right
that has developed in each jurisdiction over the years. See Arkin, supra note 7, at 576.
40
See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004).
41
See Crooker v. United States, 325 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1963). Some
jurisdictions, though, take a strictly procedural approach and claim convictions must
abate because the court no longer has jurisdiction over a deceased party. See, e.g., State
v. Griffin, 592 P.2d 372, 373 (Ariz. 1979). This rationale is flawed, and ignores the
rights of primary and collateral victims and forces their claims to fall silent. A court
“obtains personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant by the service of a summons
and complaint or by arrest. Once personal jurisdiction is obtained over a party, it will
generally not be lost as a result of subsequent events.” State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752,
763 (Alaska 2011); accord FED. R. APP. P. 43; FED. R. APP. P. 12.1 (dictating that the
“[c]ourt of appeals . . . retains jurisdiction unless it expressly dismisses the appeal”).
42
See infra Appendix, Table 1.
43
See infra Appendix, Table 2.
36
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Indefinitely Staying the Proceedings (Refusing to Abate)

Another approach courts take when a defendant dies
before exhausting his right to appeal is indefinitely staying the
proceedings (refusing to abate). When a conviction is upheld
without review, subject to jurisdictional rules, the estate is required
to satisfy any monetary, restitutionary, and compensatory
judgments ordered with the conviction.44 If the defendant
initiated an appeal before his death, the court abates the
appeal itself.45
Currently, twelve states and one circuit court practice
indefinitely staying the proceedings when a defendant dies
before exhausting his right to appeal.46 Courts embrace this
rationale because they view the presumption of innocence to
stop at the moment of conviction.47 The presumption of innocence
is replaced with a presumption that the conviction was proper.48
Courts that stay proceedings and uphold convictions without
review do so because it serves the victims’ rights by allowing the
conviction to stand.49

44

See, e.g., Carlin, 249 P.3d at 762.
See, e.g., id.
46
See infra Appendix, Table 3; see also Carlin, 249 P.3d. at 760-62 (detailing
that eight states currently dismiss appeals without review and two states, Alabama
and Oregon, practice variations of the refusal to abate method). For examples of states
that stay proceedings without review see State v. Bostwick, 740 A.2d 381 (Conn. 1999)
(where the court held that the defendant’s death rendered his appeal moot); Perry v.
State, 575 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Del. 1990) (where defendant died while the appeal of his
murder conviction was pending and the court held that it was unable to hear the
appeal because the court was “divested of its jurisdiction to proceed” upon defendant’s
death); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 135 (Idaho 2005) (where the court held that the
defendant’s conviction and restitution order must remain after his death because the
state’s substitution provision only applied in the civil context); Peters v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 1048 (1996) (where the defendant died while the appeal of his first degree murder
conviction was pending and the court dismissed his appeal because “[t]he presumption
of innocence falls with a guilty verdict” because wiping out this kind of judgment for a
reason other than a finding of error benefits no parties of the litigation and would be
likely to “produce undesirable results in the area of survivor’s rights in more instances”
than not); Royce v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. 1979) (where the
defendant died while the appeal of his manslaughter and robbery convictions was
pending and the court held that an appeal would be improper because his death
terminated the attorney client relationship, and therefore no one, including the Public
Defender, had authority or standing to speak on behalf of the deceased); State v.
Anderson, 314 S.E.2d 597, 597 (S.C. 1984) (where the court held that the defendant’s
death when his appeal was pending was grounds for dismissal, and that the State
Supreme Court substitution rule applied only in civil, not criminal contexts).
47
See, e.g., Whitehouse, 364 N.E.2d at 1016.
48
See id.; see also Nicholson v. State 254 So. 2d 881, 884 (Miss. 1971).
49
Cf. Carlin, 249 P.3d at 758-59 (noting that jurisdictions reject abatement
because of victims’ rights).
45
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Substitution

The final common approach for handling the fate of
convictions when a defendant dies before exhausting his right to
appeal is to substitute an eligible third party for the defendant
in the appellate proceedings posthumously.50 If a defendant’s
eligible personal representative so chooses, he may bring (or
proceed with) the appeal; otherwise, the conviction stands.51
Today, only ten states permit a third party representative
to substitute in appellate proceedings for a deceased defendant.52
Courts that embrace substitution do so because the death of a
criminal defendant does not necessarily render a claim moot.53
Even after the defendant’s death, there are victims’ rights and the
possibility of collateral consequences to consider.54
F.

Restitutionary Differences

Courts differ in their positions on abating monetary
punishments.55 Strict followers of abatement ab initio abate the
50

See e.g., Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1045 (Md. 2006).
See id.
52
See infra Appendix, Table 4; see e.g., Carlin, 249 P.3d at 762 (holding that
upon defendant’s death the defendant’s estate may substitute in the appellate process,
but that to allow substitution without the consent of the estate could frustrate the
interests of the estate and should not be permitted); Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297,
1303 (Miss. 1994) (holding that while the State Supreme Court rule to allow
substitution after a defendant’s death only specifically proscribes substitution in civil
proceedings it does not prohibit substitution in criminal proceedings, and that so long
as the substitution is made in a timely manner, any party may substitute in the
appellate proceedings after defendant’s death as the appeal is an appeal of right); State
v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1004 (N.M. 1997) (holding that New Mexico’s Appellate
Procedure rules allow substitution of parties upon a defendant’s death but “where no
substitution is sought by either the court or the parties, the court [should] then abate
the entire proceeding ab initio”); State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1987)
(holding that because the State’s rules of Appellate Procedure clearly allowed
substitution of parties, that the substitution of parties in criminal appeals after
defendants die is permissible so long as the substitution is made in a timely manner);
State v. Webb, 219 P.3d 695, 699 (Wash. 2009) (holding that substitution of parties is
permissible in criminal appeals if filed in a timely manner, and if no application for
substitution is filed then conviction and punishments remained intact).
53
See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 9 (1998).
54
See id. (holding that “[t]he possibility of consequences collateral to the
imposition of sentence [was] sufficiently substantial to justify . . . dealing with the merits [of
the case]” (quoting Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 484 (1957) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968). For a more
comprehensive discussion on the collateral consequences of criminal convictions see Alec C.
Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in American
Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145 (2008).
55
See United States v. DiBruno, 438 F. App’x. 198, 200 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing
and comparing United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2001)
(where restitution did not abate), United States v. Johnson, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
51
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conviction and the entire monetary judgment.56 Courts that
distinguish between penal and compensatory restitution—that
is, restitution ordered solely to punish the criminal versus
restitution ordered solely to compensate the victim—generally
abate penal restitution (regardless of the conviction’s abatement),
but uphold orders for compensatory restitution.57 Other
jurisdictions uphold the conviction because it acted as a
punishment to the defendant, but abate all restitution ordered
because enforcing the monetary judgment would punish the
defendant’s family.58 Different still, some jurisdictions abate the
conviction, but uphold the restitution.59 There are five states
that do not fall into any of the three typical procedural
categories of what to do when a defendant dies while his appeal
is pending.60
II.

PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR PRIMARY PARTIES WHEN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS IS STOPPED PREMATURELY

Abating convictions without review and staying
proceedings without review both stop the judicial process and
deny parties rights that have been afforded to them.61 To abate
a conviction without review is to say an appeal would have
necessarily been successful, and all proceedings must adhere to
the procedure of a successful appeal.62 To stay proceedings
without review is to say the appeal would have necessarily been
17204 (6th Cir. July 18, 1991) (where restitution did not abate)), and United States v.
Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. Md. 1984) (where restitution did not abate), with
United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 728-31 (9th Cir. 2010) (where restitution did
abate), United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(where restitution did abate), and United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th
Cir. 1997) (where restitution did abate)).
56
See e.g., United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012); Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d
789 (Va. 2011).
57
See, e.g., United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1997),
abrogated by United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Estate of
Parsons, 367 F.3d 409. Today, however, courts typically will not refund any amount of
restitution paid before the defendant’s death. See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 410-11, 413.
58
See United States v. DeMichael, 461 F.3d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n
uncollected fine in a criminal case is comparable to the balance of the defendant’s
prison sentence; the . . . fine, like the remaining sentence, abate[s] with death.”
(quoting United States v. Morton, 635 F.2d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 1980)).
59
See, e.g., DiBruno, 438 F. App’x. at 199 & 203.
60
Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See infra
Appendix, Table 5. Six other states, Arkansas, Delaware, Nevada, North Dakota,
Vermont, and West Virginia have not addressed this issue. Id., at n.lii.
61
See generally State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762 (Alaska 2011).
62
Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 462 (Ala. 2005).
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unsuccessful, and all proceedings must adhere to the procedure
of an unsuccessful appeal.63 But—without an actual appeal—
neither conclusion can be known for certain; and prematurely
stopping the judicial process obstructs justice. This obstruction
manifests in harm to primary and collateral victims of the
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.64
A.

Problems Caused for Defendants

The United States’ criminal justice system developed to
be protective of criminal defendants because the thought of
wrongly convicting innocent people is reprehensible.65 Persons
accused of crimes are afforded many rights and opportunities
to prove their innocence,66 including the Constitutional right to
a fair trial.67 Though neither the Constitution nor the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure grant defendants the right to
appeal their criminal convictions,68 the right to post-trial review
“has become an integral part of the adjudicatory mechanism of
every American jurisdiction.”69 The right to appeal a criminal
conviction is now an essential part of the criminal justice
system and serves as one of a defendant’s most important tools
to protect his due process rights.70
Refusing to abate a conviction, and dismissing a
defendant’s pending appeal without review, only recognizes the
rights of primary victims and strips the defendant of his due
process rights.71 This practice disregards the rights of the accused
and potentially, of collateral victims.72 Courts refuse abatement to
afford victims protection of certain rights and interests that
society feels all people have earned by virtue of being citizens,
like the right to dignity, the right to be heard, etc.,73 but every

63

See Wheat, 907 So. 2d at 462.
See generally Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 758-59.
65
See generally H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy
of the Criminal Justice System, 32-Sep. COLO. LAW., 11 (2003).
66
See id.
67
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Thomas v. Wyrick, 520 F. Supp. 139,
142 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff ’ d, 687 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1982).
68
People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Mich. 1995).
69
Arkin, supra note 7, at 576.
70
Razel, supra note 8, at 2202.
71
See United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Razel,
supra note 8, at 2213-14 (noting that many of the disadvantages of refusing abatement
are the advantages of abating).
72
Id. at 2214.
73
See, e.g., State v. Devin 142 P.3d 599 (Wash. 2006).
64
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person is granted the rights of due process and a fair trial,74 and
these rights should not be ignored regardless of whether the
defendant is dead or alive.
B.

Problems Caused for Primary Victims

Criminal law has come to recognize that victims’ rights
are an important aspect of the criminal justice system.75 This
appreciation for victims’ rights began with the Civil Rights
movement.76 Due to a rise in reported crime during the 1970s
and 1980s, public opinion of victims’ rights changed drastically,
and a community outcry for victims’ justice developed.77 When
society realized that the criminal justice system ignored victims,
several groups formed to advocate for victims and provide them
with essential services.78 Today, many states have officially
recognized the protection of certain victim interests; the
conviction of criminals is an important tool to afford victims
their rights.79 When courts abate criminal convictions, they

74

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 754 (Alaska 2011) (abolishing abatement
ab initio and permitting third party substitution after a defendant’s death “[b]ecause of
changed conditions, including increased recognition of the rights of crime victims and
rejection of abatement by some state courts.”); State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972
(Haw.) opinion after reinstatement of appeal 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995) (ordering
substitution of third parties in legal proceedings instead of abatement ab initio because
“it seem[ed] unreasonable automatically to follow the abatement ab initio rule and
pretend that the defendant was never indicted, tried, and found guilty”); State v.
Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 135 (Idaho 2005) (holding because abatement ab initio failed to
recognize victims’ rights the conviction must stand); State v. Benn, 274 P.3d 47, 50
(Mont. 2012) (abolishing abatement ab initio and staying the conviction because
abatement ab initio failed to recognize victims); State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 599
(Wash. 2006) (holding that abatement ab initio “conflict[ed] with modern laws that
compensate crime victims for their suffering”); see also David Cole, Who Pays for the Right to
Bear Arms?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/02/opinion/who-pays-for-the-right-to-bear-arms.html; Ted Poe & Carolyn Maloney,
SAFER Act Will Help Rape Victims Get Justice They Deserve, HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Jan.
2, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/275211-safer-act-will-helprape-victims-get-justice-they-deserve.
76
Razel, supra note 8, at 2204.
77
Id.
78
Id. (citing Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims’ Rights in State
Constitutions, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 163, 165 (1988)); cf. BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.: LONG TERM TRENDS AND PATTERNS, available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); see also KATHERINE
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3
(1997) (discussing the changing views on crime and criminals); David L. Roland, Progress in
the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the “Forgotten Victim”, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 35, 36
(1989).
79
Cf. Devin, 142 P.3d at 605 (where the state argued that it was harmful to
abate because the potential collateral consequences felt by victims).
75
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reimpose a burden on victims that legislatures intended to
alleviate through these victims’ rights statutes.
C.

Problems Caused for Government

The government has an interest in affording all citizens
the rights granted to them and an interest in promoting
fairness and consistency in the criminal justice system.80 When
courts abate convictions without review, courts deny victims
rights those victims have come to expect, and deny consistent
application of the law.81 When courts stay convictions without
review, courts deny defendants of rights those defendants and their
families have come to expect. This may lead citizens to lose faith in
criminal procedure and the government.82 Further, this may be a
vehicle for setting irreversible and undesirable precedents.
III.

PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR COLLATERAL PARTIES WHEN
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IS STOPPED PREMATURELY

Many parties are affected by criminal convictions, and
because each case is different, each case produces a unique
group of collateral victims. It is unjust to stop the trial process
the moment a defendant dies.
A.

Problems Caused for Defendants’ Families

When courts stay proceedings without review,
defendants’ heirs may become collateral victims.83 And because
a dead person cannot be punished—at least not terrestrially—
opponents of staying proceedings without review argue that
anything other than abating the conviction does no more than
punish the heirs of the alleged criminal and forces the heirs to
“argue about a conviction that no longer exists.”84 This
argument is flawed because without abatement, the conviction
does exist and the consequences of it are real. In many
80

See Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph, quoted in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 214 (1993) (“[T]he due
administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government.”).
81
See Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially
Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1154 (2007).
82
See Furman, supra note 65, at 25.
83
See, e.g., Crooker v. United States, 325 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1963); State
v. Jones, 551 P.2d 801, 804 (Kan. 1976).
84
United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 416 n.17 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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jurisdictions, the estate is forced to pay all restitutionary
judgments issued with the original conviction.85 If the appeal
would have been successful, though, this restitution order would
be vacated. Staying proceedings without review also ignores the
interest of the defendant’s family to “preserv[e], unstained, the
memory of the deceased defendant or his reputation”—and if
the defendant really was innocent the family should have the
opportunity to do just that.86
Further, when courts stay convictions without review,
the defendant’s estate becomes more vulnerable to civil suits
connected to the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing. The burden of
proof is lower in civil suits than in criminal cases and when a
criminal has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal court, the preponderance of the evidence standard
required in civil court is already met.87 Neither a defendant, nor
his estate, may deny the proven elements of his conviction in a
related civil suit if the conviction exists.88
B.

Problems Caused for Victims’ Families

When courts abate convictions ab initio, the victims’
families can be collaterally harmed.89 This can happen if the
court abates a restitution order that was intended to make the
victim, or the victim’s family, whole again. When courts order
restitution, a property right is created.90 Like most property,
restitution is inheritable.91 Even if the victim is dead, the right
to restitution still exists.92

85

See Alexander F. Mindlin, “Abatement Means What It Says”: The Quiet
Recasting of Abatement, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 195, 232 (2011).
86
State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976) (upholding strict
abatement ab initio). Note that it is beyond the scope of this note to consider
whether the party bringing the substitutive appeal should have the right to
counsel, though cogent arguments could be made for both sides of that debate.
87
See Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (internal citation omitted).
88
See id. at 874.
89
See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 421 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a), (c) (2012)).
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
See id.
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Problems Caused for Insurance Providers
1. Effect of Abatement on Insurance, Generally

Insurers can become collateral victims of abated criminal
convictions because the absence of a conviction decreases the
insurer’s ability to be indemnified through subrogation. With
many criminal convictions, courts order restitution to victims to
compensate for their losses,93 the losses are often monetary
injuries resulting from the criminal activity.94 If the victim was
insured at the time of injury, the insurer is the party that
compensates the victim for that loss.95 At that time, the insurer, as
subrogee, steps into the shoes of the victim and the insurer
assumes the insured’s rights against the third party.96 As
subrogee, an insurer can seek indemnification from the third
party responsible for the harm.97 But if the conviction is abated
without review, the insurer may experience the loss indefinitely
because even if the insurer pursues indemnification as subrogee,
there is no conviction to use as proof that the defendant was
responsible for the harm.98
When courts abate convictions, by nature of the
insurance industry, the harm extends to other people insured
by that insurance company and thus to society as a whole.99
People enter into insurance contracts expecting the premiums
they pay will help them (or others insured) in times of need, not
93
94

See, e.g., id. at 411; People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 1284-85 (2012).
See, e.g., Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 411; Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d

at 1284-85.
95

See, e.g., Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 411.
See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cas & Sur. Co., 743 So. 2d 140 (Ala. 2002).
For a detailed discussion on an insurer’s right to subrogation, see Johnny C. Parker,
The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance
Subrogation, 70 MO. L. REV. 723 (2005).
97
See North Star Reinsurance Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co. 82 N.Y.2d 281,
294 (“Subrogation, an equitable doctrine, entitles an insurer to ‘stand in the shoes’ of
its insured to seek indemnification from third parties whose wrongdoing has caused a
loss which the insurer is bound to reimburse; it allocates responsibility for the loss to
the person who, in equity and good conscience, ought to pay it, in the interest of
avoiding absolution of a wrongdoer from liability simply because the insured had the
foresight to procure insurance coverage.” (citations omitted)); see also Schaefer, 146
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 1285 (before abatement).
98
Cf. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 422 (Dennis, J. dissenting) (because
the conviction and the restitution order were abated, the insurance company never
regained this loss).
99
Paying premiums distributes the risk of harm; it is a process where
“individuals and organizations share the risk of misfortune. We each pay a little
(sometimes not so little) so that there will be money to pay for the losses of the
unfortunate few.” Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories,
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1994).
96
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in times of criminal activity.100 Presumably, others insured by the
insurance company do not have a moral (or legal) issue with the
company compensating the victim, but a problem develops
when an insurer is not able to be indemnified for the proven
criminal misdoings of an individual.101
The insurance industry’s communal nature imposes a
duty on insurers to limit the claims for which they allow
recovery, or alternatively, to take on the costs of pursuing
indemnification from a responsible third party.102
Similarly, if the criminal is the insured party, the
insurer should not be forced to pay for the damage the insured
caused. Typically, insurers do not provide relief for intentional
damage, and this makes it crucial for the insurer to determine if
the damage was, in fact, caused intentionally.103 Public policy
urges the refusal of recovery for the direct results of one’s own
criminal acts.104 The reason that insurance contracts cannot
compensate criminals for their intentional wrongdoing is because
there is an “imposition of externalities on third parties [which] is
a chief source of negative social costs from illegal contracts.”105
When insurers are forced to compensate for the illegal
acts of a client, there is a ripple of negative consequences, and
others unnecessarily become collateral victims of the illegal
acts.106 While direct and collateral victims of crime will always
exist, abatement extends this harm further than necessary—
100

Insurance is “[a] contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to
indemnify another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising
from the occurrence of some specified contingency . . . . An insured party [usually] pays a
premium to the insurer in exchange for the insurer’s assumption of the insured’s risk.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009); see also Baker, supra note 99, at 1401.
101
While it is true that insurers often are unable to achieve indemnification
from the responsible third party—either because of the third party’s insolvency or
another complication—that point is irrelevant to whether the insurer should be able to
seek indemnification as subrogee in the first place.
102
See Deborah A. Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance
Law Through Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (1994).
103
Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 771, 798 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (citing Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. 448 Mich. 395, 419
(1995) (Boyle, J., concurring)).
104
43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 582 (2013). But see Interstate Life Assur. Co. v.
Dalton, 165 F. 176, 178 (6th Cir. 1908) (holding if there is not an express condition
prohibiting recovery for such acts then recovery should be permitted).
105
Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal
Contracts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV 483, 493 (2009–10).
106
As discussed in the text accompanying supra note 105, insurance does not,
as a matter of legal and moral principal, compensate an individual for his illegal
misdoings. When a conviction is abated, however, the proof of illegality disappears and
makes it less likely that the insurance company will be able to be indemnified by the
defendant (or his heirs, rather) for his illegal misdoings.
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that is, abatement imposes costs on insurers and other collateral
victims—and presents courts with the task of determining the
most just solution. Compensating for illegal acts relieves a
barrier to committing crimes, facilitates criminal activity, and
protects criminals from certain consequences like restitution
payments and attorneys’ fees.107 When crimes become easier to
commit, members of society are at a higher risk of being
victimized by crime.108 Additionally, the premiums other
(assumingly innocent) clients pay are used to benefit the
wrongdoer (or, in the case of abatement, the wrongdoer’s
estate).109 All these effects could potentially influence the
decisions of people seeking insurance and cause them to seek
alternatives, or to forego insurance entirely.110 Though it is true
that people enter insurance contracts knowing that their
premiums will go to pay for the harm caused to others, if
insurance companies are unable to be indemnified for the harms
for which they pay compensation, premiums will increase and
other insured’s will bear this cost; “the business of insurance
directly and indirectly affects all sectors of the public, business[,]
and government.”111 These collateral consequences are only one of
the many reasons that a claim is not moot simply because the
defendant is dead.112

107

See 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 582. Note that the insurability punitive
damages varies from state to state. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2010) and N.Y.
INS. LAW § 3420 (McKinney 2013) (Georgia permits the insurability of punitive
damages where New York does not). But see Gollot v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297 (Miss.
1994) (holding that abatement ab initio does not harm society because, “society needs
no protection from the deceased, nor can the deceased be rehabilitated . . . [and]
potential criminals will be no less deterred from committing crimes”).
108
Cf. Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A
Common Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587, 588 (1982) (arguing the value of
deterrence is how it “affects the future conduct of the general public”).
109
See Stone, supra note 102, at 1443 (“[P]remiums will compensate the losses
of other policyholders.”).
110
Cf. id. (highlighting that insurers purposely try to disguise “the
multilateral nature of insurance contracts” because people like to think they are paying
for their own risk; not the risk of others). But see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dreeben, 20
F.2d 394, 394-95 (N.D. Tex. 1927) (holding that if insurance is too strictly regulated
people may not want to obtain it).
111
N.Y. INS. LAW § 401(a).
112
See id.; see also United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1997),
abrogated by United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004); accord Lance
Duroni, Insurer, Ex-Enron Chairman’s Widow Settle Annuity Dispute, LAW360 (Aug. 13,
2012 8:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/369357/insurer-ex-enron-chairman-s-widowsettle-annuity-dispute.
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2. Effect of Abatement on Life Insurance
The effects of abatement on life insurance exemplify the
need for an alternative judicial process—one that does not
prematurely stop the legal proceedings immediately when
defendants die—when the wrongdoer is the beneficiary of the
life insurance contract.113 Life insurance is “[a]n agreement
between an insurance company and the policy holder to pay a
specified amount to a designated beneficiary on the insured’s
death.”114 Essentially anyone with an insurable interest may take
out an insurance policy on the life of any other individual.115
Allowing recovery for a contract taken out fraudulently,
however, is prohibited.116 If a person with an insurable interest
takes out a policy on another’s life with the intent to kill that
other person and reap the benefits, recovery is impermissible;
this is known as the “Slayer Rule.”117
A slayer’s acquisition, enlargement, or accelerated possession of an
interest in property as a result of the victim’s death constitutes
unjust enrichment that the slayer will not be allowed to retain. In
particular . . . , [a] slayer may not receive the proceeds of insurance
on the life of the victim.118

Courts and legislatures rationalize the Slayer Rule
because it is reprehensible to allow criminals to reap benefits
from their own wrongs.119 Courts have sidestepped the issue of
slayers’ recovery in the abatement context, however. For
example, in State v. Krysheski, the court convicted the
defendant of murder in the first degree, but the defendant died
while his appeal was still pending.120 The State argued that
abating his conviction would cause a significant problem in this
case, and also in other cases where the murderer is the
beneficiary of the victim’s life insurance policy because it would
it would relieve a barrier to the estate of the wrongdoer

113

See, e.g., State v. Krysheski, 349 N.W.2d 729, 732 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)
(the State’s argument), overruled by State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988).
While Kryscheski was overruled, this case exemplifies the insurance problem that can
arise with abatement, and most jurisdictions still practice abatement.
114
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1010 (9th ed. 2009).
115
See Badawi, supra note 105, at 523.
116
See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV 1489 (2010).
117
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011).
118
Id. The term slayer refers to the person who killed the insured.
119
Nili Cohen, The Slayer Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 797 (2012).
120
Id.
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collecting on the insurance policy.121 The State raised this
argument as a reason to stray from the doctrine of abatement
ab initio, but the court quickly dismissed the concern in a
footnote.122 The court instead held that “this consideration
should [not] outweigh the policies of favoring abatement,” and
reasoned that “[p]robate court proceedings would adequately
protect a victim’s estate in this . . . situation.”123 While it is true
that probate proceedings might allow the victim’s estate to
recover the value of the insurance payments from the
defendant, this act would simply shift who the recipient of this
illegal payment was. The court here wrongly puts the focus on
recovery to the victim’s family. It is not the victim’s family who
had the foresight to take out insurance on the life of the victim,
it is the slayer who had this foresight. The slayer should not be
compensated by the insurance policy because the slayer took
out this insurance policy fraudulently, but the victim’s estate is
no more entitled to the insurance payments than the
defendant’s estate. Even though the victim’s estate and the
defendant’s estate may very well be the same people (for
example, if a husband fraudulently took out an insurance policy
on his wife’s life and then killed her), recovery should not be
permitted. It is the insurance company that has to bear this cost.
When insurance companies have to make payments in
situations like these, it increases the premiums that other
insured’s must pay and it undermines the integrity of insurance.
But, in the absence of a conviction (resulting from an
abatement), there is no legal reason to deny the defendant’s
estate from collecting insurance proceeds from the policy taken
out on the victim’s life.124 Once the conviction is abated, the
conviction itself may not be used to prove the elements of the
crime to assess liability in civil court so the insurance company
will have a difficult time avoiding or being indemnified for such
payments.125

121

Id.
State v. Krysheski, 349 N.W.2d 729, 732 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984),
overruled by State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988).
123
Id.
124
See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 425 (5th Cir. 2004).
125
See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874 (S.D. Tex. 2006). But see
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (“A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United
States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense
in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.”).
122
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3. Effect of Abatement on Financially Insured
Institutions
Fraud committed against a financially insured
institution may negatively affect the insurer. In United States
v. Mmahat, two brothers held the positions of president and
chairman of a federally insured institution, Gulf Federal Savings
Bank.126 To maintain the revenue they personally received from
the bank’s business, the brothers had the bank make “sham loans
to shell corporations and loan swaps with other banks so as to
conceal its weak financial position.”127 The result was “temporarily
to decrease Gulf’s delinquent loan balance and inflate its income
on its 1984 financial statements. Ultimately, their scheme failed,
and Gulf went into receivership in November 1986.”128 The Fifth
Circuit convicted the brothers for misappropriation of bank
funds and ordered them to pay restitution to the insurer.129 One
brother died while his appeal was pending, and his estate
moved to abate his conviction and the punishment. The court
held that to the extent the punishment was compensatory to
the insurance company, the punishment would not abate; but
to the extent the punishment was strictly penal in nature, the
punishment did abate.130
In Mmahat, the insurance company did not become a
collateral (or primary) victim of the deceased defendant’s fraud
because the court did not apply strict abatement ab initio, and
recognized the insurer’s interest in receiving restitution. The
court later abrogated the Mmahat decision, however, and
adopted strict abatement ab initio as the Fifth Circuit’s
practice, which subsequently forced contrary results.131
4. Effect of Abatement on Fraudulently Received
Insurance Settlements
When a defendant dies after he has already received
insurance proceeds and the court abates the conviction and
restitution order ab initio, the primary and collateral victims
include the insurance company, other insureds, and through
126

106 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated by United States v. Estate of
Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004).
127
Id. at 92.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 98.
130
Id. at 93.
131
See generally Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409.
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them other members of society because this creates the need
for higher insurance premiums to account for losses like
these.132 Nearly two decades after its decision in Mmahat, the
court abrogated its holding with United States v. Estate of
Parsons, and adopted abatement ab initio as the practice in the
Fifth Circuit.133 In Estate of Parsons, the defendant was
convicted for arson. Before his conviction, he illegally collected
insurance proceeds to cover his property loss. When the court
convicted him, it ordered restitution of over $1.3 million dollars
to the insurance company as compensation for the defendant’s
fraud.134 The defendant died with his appeal pending, and the
court abated his conviction ab initio.135 The court held that
abatement ab initio vacated not only the conviction, but also
the restitution order to the insurer.136
IV.

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

A.

Victims’ Rights Legislation

In recent decades, Congress has made an attempt to
formally recognize crime victims’ rights through acts like the
Victim Witness Protection Act,137 the Mandatory Victim’s
Restitution Act,138 the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,139 and the Justice
for All Act.140 Such statutes protect the essential rights society
feels each individual has earned just by virtue of being citizens.
These rights deserve recognition because “too often victims of
crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the
criminal justice system.”141 These acts formally grant victims
necessary rights: the right to restitution in the “full amount of
each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without
consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant”;142
132

See infra notes 133-36.
Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 418.
134
Id. at 411.
135
Id. at 416.
136
Id. The court did not require the insurer to refund any payments the
defendant made before his death. Id. at 411.
137
18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012).
138
Id.
139
Id. § 3771.
140
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat 2260.
141
150 CONG. REC. §10910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Kyl).
142
United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § § 3663A(a), (c), 3364(f)(2)-(4)) (where the act mandates that the right
to restitution is inheritable so “if the victim is deceased,” the victim’s family has the
right to restitution).
133
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the right to “be reasonably protected from the accused”;143 “[t]he
right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim’s dignity and privacy”;144 and the right to participate in
criminal proceedings,145 among others.
Victims’ rights statutes do not limit protection to the
primary victims of harm because there is an interest in
“minimizing secondary harm from the criminal process.”146 The
individual—whether it is an insurance company or another
person—who compensates a victim for the loss addressed by a
restitution order “may to the extent of the payment be
subrogated to the victim’s right against the restitution debtor.”147
B.

Current Legal Landscape

Virginia is currently the only jurisdiction in the United
States that has a statutory procedure to follow when a
defendant dies before exhausting his right to appeal.148 The
highest courts in three other states—Hawaii, New Mexico, and
Ohio—have each held that the states’ rules of appellate
procedure that allow substitution in civil cases extend to allow
substitution in appeals of criminal cases after a defendant dies
while his appeal is pending.149 The highest court in Oregon has
held that the state’s appelate procedure rules demand
abatement of a criminal conviction when a defendant dies
while his appeal is pending.150 Other than these exceptions,
there is no statutory guidance for what to do when this problem
arises. Because of the lack of statutory guidance, when a
defendant dies before exhausting his right to appeal, the rights
afforded to victims—even rights that are said to be
mandatory151—are jeopardized.152 Some jurisdictions continue to
143

Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat 2260.
Id.
145
18 U.S.C. § 3771.
146
Beloof, supra note 81, at 1150.
147
Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 422 (internal citations omitted).
148
See Thomas, supra note 7. Since the most recent update of this A.L.R.
article, Virginia has codified the method of staying the proceedings (refusing to abate).
See Abatement of Criminal Conviction; Effect of Death of Convicted Person While Case
on Appeal, Va. Code §19.2-8.2 (2012).
149
State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw.) opinion after reinstatement of
appeal 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995); State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1003-04 (N.M. 1997);
State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1987).
150
State v. Kaiser, 683 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Or. 1984).
151
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012) (Mandatory Restitution to Victims of
Certain Crimes).
152
See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 1999) vacated, 719
N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1999); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
144
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utilize the outdated method of abatement ab initio because
stare decisis demands it, and a decision to stray from precedent
is a decision best left to the legislature.153 Courts therefore
refuse to acknowledge victims’ rights in the abatement context
absent legislation specifically providing otherwise.154 This
produces archaic results.155
In 2011, the Virginia Supreme Court in Bevel v.
Commonwealth, refused to dictate even a mandatory common
law procedure when a criminal defendant dies before completing
his appeal.156 The court held that it is the legislature’s place, not
the court’s, to govern proper practices and procedures in
criminal law.157 In Bevel, the court convicted the defendant of
incest, and he died while his appeal was pending. The court
noted that, in this particular instance, it was not contrary to
justice to apply abatement ab initio because no collateral
harms were immediately recognizable. But it held that because
“[i]t [was] conceivable that . . . a criminal conviction could have
a significant negative impact on a deceased defendant’s estate
or the rights of his heirs or another party,” abatement ab initio
was not appropriate in all circumstances.158 Because it is always
conceivable that a conviction could have significant negative
impact on other parties involved, it would be improper to have
a rule that mandates abatement ab initio in all circumstances.
Subsequently, in February 2012, Virginia enacted
legislation that officially adopted the method that stays the
dissenting); see also United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
The Lay Court recognized the rights of the deceased, the primary victims, and the
collateral victims may be better served with permissible substitution but upheld
abatement ab initio anyway because of stare decisis: “[A]llowing the estate to
substitute for the dead defendant ensures the fair representation of the decedent’s
interests, but such a substitution does not align logically with the abatement of all
prior criminal proceedings.” Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
153
See, e.g., People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 501 (2012) (upholding
strict abatement ab initio because “neither the state constitutional provision
establishing the right to victim restitution nor the statutory scheme governing victim
restitution specifically addresse[d] whether a defendant’s death pending appeal abates
a victim restitution order” (internal citations omitted)); Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717
S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011); see also United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2007) (where the court recognized the monetary windfall abatement provides
defendants but upheld abatement ab initio because “binding precedent . . . require[d]”
it to do so).
154
See, e.g., Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324.
155
Accord In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. Ct. App.
2012); cf. Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 463 (Ala. 2005); State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752,
758 (Alaska 2011).
156
Bevel, 717 S.E.2d at 795.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 795-96.
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judicial proceedings after a defendant dies before exhausting his
right to appeal (refusing to abate).159 While it is important to
codify the procedure to follow when a criminal defendant dies
before completing his appeal, it is equally important to enact
legislation that produces the most just results.160 Substitution is
the only method that adequately addresses the interests of all
parties concerned.161
Tables 1-5 in the Appendix illustrate the different stances
that each state and circuit takes on the issue of abatement.
V.

PERMISSIBLE SUBSTITUTION AS THE SOLUTION

A.

The Need for a Solution

A defendant’s death while his appeal is pending poses
the question: “What is the purpose of criminal law?”162 If the
159

Abatement of Criminal Conviction; Effect of Death of Convicted Person
While Case on Appeal, Va. Code §19.2-8.2 (2012).
160
See Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Miss. 1994) (“If the abatement
ab initio rule is perceived to be unjust, it is equally unjust to allow a conviction to stand
and be used against the deceased’s estate for various collateral matters as if the appeal
had been heard and the conviction affirmed.”).
161
See id.
162
Courts have tried to answer this question in the context of abatement.
Compare United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding
abatement ab initio because “the interests of justice ordinarily require that [the
defendant] not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is
an ‘integral part of [our] system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.’”
(quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)), and Surland v. State, A.2d 1034,
1038-39 (Md. 2006) (upholding abatement ab initio because “the criminal justice
system exists primarily to punish and cannot effectively punish one who has died”
(quoting United States v. Estate of Parsons, 357 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2004)), with
State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 764 (Alaska 2011) (enforcing permissible substitution in
criminal appeals because “[c]riminal administration [is] based upon the following: the
need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the rights of
victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation”),
Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 794 (Va. 2011) (abolishing abatement ab
initio (but declining to decide the issue of permissible substitution), the court held that
“the criminal justice system does not only serve to punish, but it also serves to protect
and compensate crime victims”), State v. Devin, P.3d 599, 604-05 (Wash. 2006)
(abolishing abatement ab initio and staying the conviction because punishment of the
offender is not the sole purpose of criminal law, holding that “[the] State’s goal is to
ward off potential harm to innocent people”), Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 539
(1998) (acknowledging that there is an interest in punishing offenders but
distinguishing that the interest is shared by the “State and crime victims alike”), and
United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to abate
restitution because “[i]t is separate and distinct from any punishment visited upon the
wrongdoer and operates to ensure that a wrongdoer does not procure any benefit
through his conduct at others’ expense”). Accord Lynn Johnston Splitek, State v.
McDonald: Death of A Criminal Defendant Pending Appeal in Wisconsin—The Appeal
Survives, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 811, 813 (1989) (stating that “[t]he purposes for
enforcement of criminal laws are the punishment and reform of the guilty and the
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purpose of criminal law is solely to punish the defendant, then
abatement ab initio serves this purpose well because a person
cannot be punished once he is dead. But the decades-long
struggle to shift the focus of criminal law from a penal nature
to a protective nature illustrates that this is too narrow a view
because abatement ignores the collateral consequences that
may arise.163 When punishment comes at too high a cost—and is
punishment for punishment’s sake—then the fundamental
underpinnings of any justice system have the potential to be
destroyed. Criminal law is a tool to punish criminals and to
make parties whole again;164 it is a tool to protect members of
society and to make members of society feel protected.165
When courts abate convictions, justice owed to primary
victims is obstructed, collateral victims are created, and harm
is extended. It is unreasonable, unnecessary, and unjust to
ignore the rights of affected parties.166
On the other hand, when courts stay proceedings
without review, defendants’ rights are ignored and defendants’
heirs become collateral victims of the judicial process.167 Balancing
defendants’ rights and expectations, victims’ rights and
expectations, and members of society’s rights and expectations
against each other is essential. Victims expect a restitution
order at the moment of conviction, defendants expect the chance
to appeal, and members of society expect justice in all

protection of the public” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65 (La.
1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
163
See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 422 (5th Cir. 2004)
(Dennis, J., dissenting); supra Parts II & III.
164
See supra note 162.
165
See People v. Robinson, 699 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Ill. 1998), vacated, 719
N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1999). The court abated the deceased defendant’s conviction because
enforcing the conviction of “a defendant who is no longer able to appreciate the benefits
of such a ruling, would have a senselessly harsh impact upon the psychological well
being of [the defendant’s] surviving family.” Id. On review, however, the court refused
to abate the conviction because abatement would have a “senselessly harsh impact on
the psychological well-being of crime victims and their families by implying that
defendants have somehow been exonerated.” Id.; see also State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d
564, 567 (N.J. 1997) (where the court gave the “jury sufficient latitude to consider the
decedent’s prior mistreatment and physical and psychological abuse of [his wife]”);
supra note 162.
166
See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). But see United States v. Estate
of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 2004) (expressing fear that the term “victim”
would be misused and that a defendant would be wrongly convicted by trying to protect
other parties from errors in the proceeding).
167
See Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62, 65 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) Justice
Douglas noted the significant interest the deceased defendant’s heirs have to protect
the estate: “If the conviction stands, those collateral consequences or penalties will be
the likely reduction of appellant’s estate through the collection of costs from it.”
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proceedings.168 These expectations, developed through state and
federal common law, are consistent with the current justice
system.169 A defendant’s death should not vitiate the rights or
interests of any party affected.170
Without written abatement procedures, too many people
are left asking large, overarching legal questions.171 Neither
crime victims, alleged criminals, parties with collateral
interests in the outcome of a case, nor members of society want
courts re-questioning the criminal justice system’s purpose
during trial. Citizens deserve to know that there are practices
and protocols in place, that those practices and protocols lead
to the fairest results possible, and that our government officials
are devoted to ensuring justice.172 Prematurely stopping the
judicial process can offend the rights of parties on either side of
the litigation, but there is no reason to offend the rights of any
party after a defendant’s death because substitution recognizes
the rights of all parties involved.173 A substitution statute
resembling the model statute proposed in this note would
protect the rights and interests of primary and collateral
parties.
B.

Sample Substitution Statute
Substitution of Parties in Criminal Appeals After Death
(a) Procedure
After a criminal conviction, if the defendant dies before
exhausting his right to appeal, the case does not
automatically become moot. Any eligible, interested
party may elect to substitute in the criminal appeal.
Should the appellate court elect to reverse the
conviction on the substitutive appeal, the defendant’s
conviction and all punishment ordered (compensatory,
168

Beloof, supra note 81 at 1135-36, 1153, 1158-59.
See id. at 1153, 1158-59.
170
Id. at 1159.
171
See Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011); see also
supra note 162.
172
Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833-34 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 618
(1983), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972)) (noting that stare decisis is
“not an imprisonment of reason” and that “however admirable [the justice system]’s
resolute adherence to the law as it . . . a decision contrary to the public sense of
justice . . . operates . . . to diminish respect for the courts and for law itself”).
173
See State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 380-81 (Ohio 1987).
169
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penal, and restitutionary) shall vacate, and the record
shall reflect a successful appeal in the same manner as
if the defendant himself successfully appealed while
living. If, however, the appellate court does not elect to
reverse the conviction, the defendant’s conviction and
punishment
orders
(compensatory,
penal,
and
restitutionary) shall be upheld and enforced.
Substituting parties may, however, elect to continue to
pursue the appeal through the appropriate channels.
The appellate court may not elect to remand the case. If
a conviction is vacated the State may not retry the case.
(b) Appeals Permitted
A party may substitute in appeals of right and appeals
of discretion.
(c) Timing
Substitution shall be valid so long as the substitutive
appeal is made within 180 days from the last day the
defendant himself or herself would have been permitted
to bring the appeal were he or she still living.
(d) Parties Permitted to Substitute
Defendant’s successor, estate, representative, or any
other interested party including, but not limited to, a
public or private defense attorney may elect to
substitute in the appellate process.
C.

Why Courts Do Not Adopt Substitution

Many courts refuse to adopt substitution because, in
their view, the defendant’s death renders the controversy
moot.174 A moot case is “a matter in which a controversy no
longer exists; a case that presents only an abstract question
that does not arise from existing facts or rights.”175 Courts
174

See, e.g., State v. Krysheski, 349 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984),
overruled by State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988) (upholding abatement ab
initio and noting abatement is not a comment on the defendant’s guilt or innocence, but
“a return to the status quo before commencement of the case based on a determination
to hold the case moot due to the futility of resolving the defendant’s appeal”).
175
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (9th ed. 2009). Mootness heavily relies on
ripeness, defined as the circumstance existing when a case “has reached, but has not
passed, the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent
and useful decision to be made.” Id. at 1442.
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typically do not entertain moot cases. Nevertheless, there are
many instances where courts are at liberty to hear “moot”
claims.176 For example, courts may hear technically “moot”
appeals when “collateral consequences arise from the
challenged ruling”177—so that the claims do not “evade
review.”178 One court went as far to as hear a “moot” claim
because it could not be proven that no collateral consequences
attached to the appellant’s order.179 Because it is impossible to
see or foresee all collateral consequences, it may never be
possible to prove that no collateral consequences exist.
Critics argue that if a court did hear an appeal after a
defendant died, it would be strictly academic or, alternatively,
it could only punish the defendant’s family.180 First, while it is
true some results cannot effectuate with substitution,181 (e.g., if
the court orders a new trial or confirms the defendant’s prison
sentence),182 this is outweighed by the benefit of the results that
can be effectuated.183 The effect of abatement on collateral
parties is not only relevant to consider, but also nearly
impossible to ignore. Second, substitution does not punish the
defendant’s family; it simply prevents them from receiving the

176

See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV 562, 563 (2009). The right to raise a mootness concern, however, is not
waivable because it arises from Article III of the United States Constitution. See id.
177
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)
(civil case).
178
Hall, supra note 176, at 583. Further, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402
(1975), the court held the Article III “live controversy” requirement of the Constitution
“may exist . . . between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by
the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.”
Essentially, recovery does not need to be to a primary victim of the wrongdoing but
could be afforded to collateral victims. See id. Additionally, in New Jersey, the state
constitution itself does not require that the controversy is “live” and the court
entertains “moot” appeals if there is a strong public policy reason to do so. See
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371-72 & n.2 (1993) (holding that
“reinstatement of the record of the charges against respondent would carry collateral
legal consequences and that, therefore, a live controversy remains”).
179
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 84 (where a mother
appealed the termination of her parental rights of her severely disabled child but her
child died while the appeal was pending).
180
Razel, supra note 8, at 2211, 2219.
181
See, e.g., State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976) (noting if the appeal
was permitted and a new trial was ordered the new trial could not proceed because the
defendant would be unavailable).
182
A trial cannot be held against a person who is not alive and likewise a
person who is not alive cannot serve a prison sentence. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see
also Mindlin, supra note 85 at 232.
183
See infra Part V.D.
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windfalls of abatement.184 When a defendant’s estate is required
to pay the defendant’s restitution order after his death, the
estate is satisfying the order with the very same funds the
defendant himself would have used to satisfy the order (if he
were still alive). Because of this, the estate is not losing funds
that would have rightly benefitted it; the order would satisfy
the proper allocation of the funds (because the defendant would
have allocated the funds to satisfy his restitution order).
Abating such an order could create a windfall to the estate.
Alternatively, if the defendant successfully appealed his
conviction, the funds would not be allocated to satisfy the
restitution order. Thus to stay the order could create a windfall
to the victim or the victim’s estate. But if the goal of criminal
punishment is to protect innocent people from undue harm
then it seems inconsistent with this goal to protect the heirs of
criminals but to ignore their victims.185
Other courts refuse substitution expressly because there
are no statutory rules providing otherwise.186 By codifying the
substitution method, however, the possibility of these windfalls
can be avoided.
D.

Why Courts and Legislatures Should Adopt Substitution

Courts and legislatures should adopt the substitution
method because a substitution method similar to the model
statute posed in this note closely parallels what would happen
if the defendant had not died. The interests that primary and
collateral parties have in the conviction’s final ruling prevent
the controversy from becoming moot.187 With substitution,
parties can be afforded almost the same rights they would be
afforded if the defendant were alive.

184

See, e.g., United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007)
(where the court recognized the monetary windfall abatement provides defendants but
upheld abatement ab initio because “binding precedent . . . require[d]” it to do so).
185
See State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 605-06 (Wash. 2006). But see Whitehouse
v. State, 266 364 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (Ind. 1977) (“Although a criminal conviction
carries a definite ‘fall-out’ that extends beyond the person of the defendant, we are
aware of no right to be free of such, even if such conviction be erroneous.”).
186
See e.g., Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011).
187
See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 764 (Alaska 2011) (“The interests of the
victim and the community’s interest in condemning the offender persist even after the
defendant’s death.”).
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1. Substitution Recognizes Defendants’ Interests
Courts should not deny defendants their rights, even in
the event of a defendant’s death. Refusing to abate ignores
defendants’ right to a fair trial. Substitution, however, affords
defendants the right to fair trials by allowing post-trial review
of their conviction, and by maintaining their presumption of
innocence.188 Though abatement affords defendants the right to
a fair trial, abatement denies other parties essential rights; the
model substitution statute would afford defendants the right to
a fair trial without ignoring the rights and interests of others.
One commentator has argued, however, that posthumous
appeal ignores defendants’ right to a fair trial because it ignores
defendants’ right to dictate how far to take the appeal process.189
If the defendant is not alive he cannot exercise this right, but the
role a defendant plays in criminal appeals is very limited.190
There are likely few instances where a defendant would feel his
rights were violated by a court reviewing his conviction.
Further, because the model statute allows for parties to elect to
substitute in the appellate process, it is likely that the parties
would elect to do so, at least in part, to defend the defendant’s
rights rather than to offend his rights. While it is true that
defendants may have an interest in halting the appeal, most
rational people would prefer the opportunity to have their
appeal heard.
2. Substitution Recognizes Primary Victims’ Interests
Criminal defendants’ deaths should not impinge on
victims’ rights. Substitution is necessary to afford victims their
rights.191 States recognize the importance of victims feeling

188

Some jurisdictions view the enduring presumption of innocence to be a part
of a defendant’s right to a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367
F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that it is consistent with the right to post-trial
review that the presumption of innocence endures until the defendant has exhausted
his right to appeal).
189
Razel, supra note 8, at 2218-19 (citing Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034,
1041 (Md. 2006)).
190
For an example of why this is true, see FED. R. APP. P. 27 (ordering that
“[a] motion will be decided without oral argument unless the court orders otherwise”).
If oral argument is ordered and the appellant is not present at the proceeding the court
may still hear the appellee’s argument; if neither party is present, the case is decided
on the briefs prepared by the parties’ attorneys. See FED R. APP. P. 27 (cmts.).
191
Cf. State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762-63 (Alaska 2011) (adopting the substitution
method because both abatement and refusal to abate offend a party’s rights).

2013]

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNED

1731

protected and redeemed by the criminal justice system.192
Convicting criminals is an important tool to achieve this goal,
but when courts abate convictions, victims are denied this right.
First, while it may be possible for most parties to seek
monetary compensation in civil court (where the burden of
proof is lower),193 it is impractical to assume civil court
proceedings will properly afford victims their rights because
without a conviction the results of the civil proceedings are
unpredictable. If substitution is permitted, victims have the
same opportunity to use proof of the final conviction in civil
proceedings as they would if the defendant were still alive;194 if
the conviction were abated, the lower burden of proof does not
ensure the victim a favorable result in civil proceedings.
Second, this wrongly assumes the victims’ only interests
are monetary; victims also have interests in being heard and
having wrongdoers convicted, among other interests.195 Most
importantly, substitution affords victims a form of due process
without denying defendants that same right.196 Further,
because interests in restitution are inheritable, substitution
recognizes the victims’ families’ interests.197 Even if the victim
is dead, the victims’ family still has an interest in a final ruling
on the conviction—a right which substitution affords.198
3. Substitution Recognizes Governments’ Interests
Substitution also protects courts and government
agencies. First, substitution protects courts from further
unnecessary litigation.199 If the court allows the appeal to
192

For a more comprehensive look at how states balance victim’s interests in
the criminal justice system see Beloof, supra note 81. The right to feel heard and be
protected has also been granted federally. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 60.
193
United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006). This is
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure allow victims to bring claims against the deceased’s estate, and also permit
interested parties to act as substitutes for the defendant if they file within a certain
time. FED. R. APP. P. 43; FED. R. CIV. P. 25; FED. R. CIV. P. 25 (Comm. Notes); see also 1
AM. JUR. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 50 (2013).
194
This is not possible, however, when the conviction abates because
abatement ab initio treats the conviction as if it never happened. See United States v.
Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 414 n.14 (5th Cir. 2004).
195
See supra Part IV.A.
196
See supra Part V.D.1.
197
See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a), (c) (2012)).
198
See id.
199
See Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1303 (Miss. 1994). But see Razel,
supra note 8, at 2210 (noting that it may waste the court’s time to hear such an appeal).
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continue and the conviction is affirmed then it will not be
necessary to initiate separate civil actions.200 If, on the other
hand, the court finds a reversible error on appeal, a civil
proceeding can be conducted to resolve any collateral issues.201
Substitution cuts costs and promotes judicial economy.202
Because the results of substitution closely mirror what would
happen if the defendant never died, it promotes fairness and
consistency in the criminal justice system and it provides a layer
of protection that avoids setting irreversible and undesirable
precedents from cases that are never able to be reviewed.
4. Substitution Recognizes Defendants’ Families’
Interests
Substitution also protects defendants’ families. First,
because it does not uphold the conviction without review, it
allows families the chance to preserve the family name.203 Second,
it prevents defendants’ families from becoming unnecessarily
vulnerable in subsequent civil proceedings.204 If the substitutive
appeal is successful, the defendant’s conviction vacates, making
it more difficult—though not impossible—for third parties to
prevail against the estate in civil proceedings.205
Substitution also ensures that defendants’ families are
not forced to unjustly enrich victims or the State with the
estate’s assets, which would be allocated to the heirs of the
estate.206 Consider what could have resulted in Mmahat if
substitution had been permitted.207 If a party had substituted in
the appellate proceedings to seek a final ruling on Mmahat’s
guilt or innocence, it is possible the appeal would have been
successful and the estate would not have been forced to pay
restitution. When such appeals are successful, the court should
abate the conviction and the restitution order (as in the model

200

State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1988).
Id.
Cf. Razel, supra note 8, at 2210 (noting courts’ interest in efficiency).
203
See State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976) (“[T]he surviving family
has an interest in preserving, unstained, the memory of the deceased defendant or his
reputation.”).
204
See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
205
This is because there is no longer any proof of a conviction.
206
Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1049 (Md. 2006). See supra Part I.C.
207
United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 91-93 (5th Cir. 1997) (where
brothers misappropriated funds of a financially insured institution).
201
202
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statute) to ensure that no party “enjoy[s] the fruits of an
untested conviction.”208
5. Substitution Recognizes Insurance Providers’
Interests
Substitution could also benefit insurers by protecting
them from erroneous payments and unnecessary litigation they
might otherwise be subjected to if abatement or refusal to
abate were applied.209 Common civil proceedings with liability
insurers highlight this benefit. Liability insurance is “[a]n
agreement to cover a loss resulting from the insured’s liability
to a third party, such as a loss incurred by a driver who injures
a pedestrian.”210 Courts allow substitution in the civil context;
courts recognize the need for the litigation to continue on a
party’s death and recognize that a party’s death does not
render the claim moot.211
Consider People v. Schaefer, mentioned at the beginning
of this note.212 In 2010, a jury convicted Schaefer for murdering
a nine-year-old girl, in the second-degree, as a result of his
drunk driving. Schaefer also injured the girl’s father,
necessitating the amputation his leg; Schaefer’s actions cost the
victims’ family more than $1.3 million dollars in medical (among
other) expenses. Along with Schaefer’s conviction, the court
ordered restitution to the family to cover their expenses.
Schaefer appealed his conviction, but died while the appeal was
pending.213 California followed the rule of strict abatement ab
initio (where absolutely everything from the inception of the
case is abated, including restitution), and so the court abated
Schaefer’s conviction and the restitution order.214 Because “[a]
victim restitution order requires a conviction for a crime that
caused the victim’s loss,”215 without any “specific statute

208

United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2004).
C.f. State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 969 (Haw. 1995) (“[T]he abated
conviction cannot be used in any related civil litigation.”), opinion after reinstatement of
appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1996).
210
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 873 (9th ed. 2009).
211
For example, in Broyle v. Eagle Picher Industries, 123 F.R.D. 230 (M.D. La
1988) (where the court held that it was proper for a deceased man’s wife to substitute
in the products liability action initiated by that man after his death).
212
146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012). See Introduction, supra.
213
Id. at 498.
214
Id. at 499-501. More recently, the court has left open the possibility of
posthumous appeals. See People v. Her, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 977, 978 n.1 (App. Ct. 2013).
215
Id. at 501.
209
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expressing the contrary,” the court was compelled to abate both
the conviction and the restitution order.216
The court did not acknowledge the effect this abatement
would have on primary or collateral parties involved. Without the
restitution order to the family, it is plausible that the victim’s
insurance company (or worse, the victim’s family) will have to
satisfy this debt without the possibility of indemnification.217
Also consider the consequences that might arise if the
driver’s insurance company has to compensate the defendant’s
estate for the defendant’s wrongdoing. Insurance companies
hire underwriters to determine the potential risk of each client,
which determines the premiums clients must pay to the insurer
to assume the risk of harm.218 Insurance does not account for
“moral hazard” or any other intentional wrongdoing by the
insured.219 Moral hazard becomes a problem when individuals
who “are or have been affected by a contract of insurance [fail]
to uphold the accepted moral qualities.”220 When a conviction
abates there is no longer legal proof that the action was a
“moral hazard” because all proceedings, including the
indictment, vacate.221 This may force the insurance company to
allocate funds to conduct its own investigation to prove that
recovery should not be afforded because without a conviction
the insurer, as subrogee, cannot automatically recover these
funds—to the extent that the defendant’s estate has these
funds—from the defendant’s estate.
Substitution, however, would allow the insurance
company the opportunity to seek indemnification from the
defendant’s estate with the same likelihood of recovery as if the
defendant were still alive.
E.

Who Should be Allowed to Substitute in Appellate
Proceedings?

As indicated in the model statute, substitution should
be permitted to any interested third party as long as the

216

Id.
Currently, there have been no civil motions filed by any parties.
218
Joni Woloniecki, The Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Law: Where
Is It in the 21st Century?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 63, 63-64 (2002).
219
“Moral hazard [is] any personal habit or activity of the insured that would
cause him to be something less than a standard risk for insurance.” Baker, supra note
99, at 1403.
220
EDWIN J. FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 327 (1960).
221
See United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007).
217
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substitution is filed in a timely manner.222 The model statute
allows for an additional 180 days to file the substitutive appeal
because of the complications and delays that the defendant’s
death may cause. Defendants’ estates, families, and insurers
can all have interests in a final review of the deceased’s
conviction. The list of parties that could have an interest in
final review of this kind of case is not finite because there could
be a greater public interest at stake. Because of this greater
public interest, the deceased’s private attorney or public
defender or any other legitimately interested party should be
allowed to substitute in the appellate proceedings; this would
not violate the rights or interests of any other party.223
For example, in Gartland v. State, after the court
charged the defendant with reckless manslaughter of her
husband, she died while her appeal was pending.224 At trial, the
defendant had claimed self-defense against her husband’s
brutal abuse.225 The court allowed a substitute to pursue the
appeal because the state had a “strong commitment to the
eradication of domestic violence[,] . . . murder[,] and other
offenses committed with guns.”226 Effectively, the court
recognized that setting a precedent like this without allowing
any opportunity for review could lead to a slippery slope that
would hinder the effort to eradicate domestic violence and to
change how it is handled in the courts. This potential effect
necessitated the case’s review and negated the possibility of the
appeal immediately becoming moot when the defendant died.
The court held there was an important balance to strike and
“interests of the defendant or society at large may be at stake if
an erroneous conviction is left standing.”227
By making substitution permissible rather than
mandatory, no party is unwillingly burdened.228 Permissible
222

In Hawaii, for example, if interested parties make a timely motion for the
defendant’s appeal of right the reviewing court has the discretion to “(1) dismiss the
appeal as moot, vacate the original judgment of conviction, and dismiss all related
criminal proceedings, or, in the alternative, (2) enter such other order as the appellate
court deems appropriate pursuant to [Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure].” State v.
Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw.), opinion after reinstatement of appeal, 927 P.2d 419
(Haw. 1995). Cf. Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 794 (Va. 2011); State v.
Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 599-603, 605-06 (Wash. 2006).
223
See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 765-66 (Alaska 2011), State v. Gartland,
694 A.2d 564, 568 (N.J. 1997).
224
Gartland, 694 A.2d at 568.
225
Id. at 569.
226
Id. at 568.
227
Id. at 569.
228
But see Razel, supra note 8, at 2222.
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substitution does not require defendants’ estates to bear the
cost of the appeal, rather it permits them the opportunity to
embrace the costs and the appeal if they so choose. If a party
decides to bring an appeal, that party recognizes that the
interests of appellate review outweigh the costs of the appeal.229
F.

The Procedure and Results of Substitution

When courts have allowed substitution, the results have
been consistent with what would occur if the defendant lived to
see the appeal through.230 If a third party chooses to bring an
appeal on behalf of the deceased defendant, the party should
file notice of appeal and pay the district clerk “all required
fees.”231 If the substitutive appeal is successful, the conviction
should vacate, any restitution ordered should vacate, and costs
should be charged against the appellee subject to local rules (as
enumerated in the model statute). This result allows defendants’
families to benefit from the estate’s full value, and it avoids the
unjust enrichment of third parties.232
Alternatively, if the substitutive appeal is unsuccessful,
the court should affirm the conviction, enforce the restitution,
and “tax” costs “to the appellant” (subject to local rules).233 This
result does not harm defendants’ families because the deceased’s
estate is a product of the deceased.234 The estate should pay all
fines and restitution rightly owed by the defendant. To order
otherwise would unjustly enrich the estate and its
beneficiaries.235 It is fair to satisfy a restitution order using funds
from the defendant’s estate because the beneficiaries of the
estate would not benefit from those funds had the defendant
lived to see the appeal through.236 Substitution produces the
229

See FED. R. APP. P. 3. The Federal Rules mandate that “[u]pon filing a
notice of appeal, the appellant must pay the district clerk all required fees. The district
clerk receives the appellate docket fee on behalf of the court of appeals.” Id. If the
appellant believes the costs outweigh the benefits of bringing the appeal, the appellant
may simply choose to abstain from filing the appeal. Id.
230
Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 39.
231
Id.
232
Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011).
233
Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 39.
234
An estate is “[t]he amount, degree, nature, and quality of a person’s
interest in land or other property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (9th ed. 2009).
235
See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 423 n.16 (5th Cir.
2004); United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting the
possibility that abatement would unjustly enrich the defendant’s estate but ultimately
upholding abatement because civil proceedings may provide relief for victims).
236
The defendant would have satisfied the restitution from his own assets
thereby decreasing the value of his estate. See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 422-24;
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fairest results of any current posthumous appellate procedure
because it does not prematurely stop the trial process and dictate
a ruling regardless of what an actual review would produce.
G.

Substitution Today

Currently, ten states allow substitution in appellate
proceedings after a defendant dies before exhausting his right
to appeal.237 Jurisdictions that practice substitution acknowledge
the defendants’ interests, the victims’ interests, and the
collateral parties’ interests.238 Because convictions carry with
them the possibility of collateral effects, it benefits society to
review the merits of the criminal proceedings.239 The death of a
defendant should not extinguish his rights or the rights of
anyone else affected by the alleged wrongdoing.240
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the victims’ rights movement—and with
the purview of collateral consequences for families, insurers,
and members of society—it is archaic and unjust to ignore the
effect posthumous abatement has on the interests of all parties.
Staying proceedings without review, however, ignores the due
process rights the Constitution affords every American—
including defendants. In the absence of legislation ordering
otherwise, courts are bound to dated principles or, alternatively,
are constantly forced to re-question the purpose of criminal law.
People v. Ekinici, 743 N.Y.S.2d 651, 655-56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); see also Lay, 456 F.
Supp. 2d at 871 (United States’ opposition).
237
In recent years a growing minority of courts have adopted this rationale
and abandoned the archaic practice of abatement ab initio. See, e.g., State v. Clements,
668 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1996); State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967 (Haw.), opinion after
reinstatement of appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 133
(Idaho 2005) (citing Ekinici, 743 N.Y.S.2d 651); People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160
(Mich. 1995); State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1000-05 (N.M. 1997); State v. Hoxsie, 570
N.W.2d 379, 379-82 (S.D. 1997); State v. Christensen, 886 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah
1993); Perry v. State, 575 A.2d 1154 (Del. 1990).
238
See, e.g., State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio 1987); see also
supra note 52.
239
State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1988).
240
See Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 793 (Va. 2011); see also
Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 463-64 (Ala. 2005) Here, the court noted the current
trend for courts to abolish abatement ab initio and embrace substitution. The court
stated, “We expect this trend will continue as the courts and public begin to appreciate
the callous impact such a procedure necessarily has on the surviving victims of violent
crime.” Id. Despite this, the court declined to adopt substitution and upheld abatement
ab initio, but ordered that the record reflect that the conviction was abated because of
the defendant’s death. Id.
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A statute permitting substitution—like the model statute set
forth in this note—is the only remedy that adequately addresses
the rights of all interested parties. Substitution affords
defendants appellate review without forcing untested revictimization, or initial collateral-victimization, on any party.
Sabrina Margret Bierer†
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Jurisdictions that Apply Strict Abatement Ab Initio
Jurisdiction
Fifth Circuiti
Sixth Circuitii
Seventh Circuitiii
Eighth Circuitiv
Ninth Circuitv
Tenth Circuitvi
Eleventh Circuitvii
Arizonaviii
Coloradoix
District of Columbiax
Illinoisxi
Louisianaxii
Mainexiii
Missourixiv
Nebraskaxv
New Yorkxvi
Rhode Islandxvii
Tennesseexviii
Wyomingxix
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Table 2
Other Jurisdictions that Currently Abate
Jurisdiction
Special Rules
Second Circuit
Abatement ab initio with the possibility that
restitution orders would be upheld if the facts of
the case demand itxx
Third Circuit
Abatement ab initio when a defendant dies after
“filing an appropriate appeal”; restitution orders
may not be appealedxxi
D.C. Circuit
Abatement ab initio even when the defendant is
guilty by reason of plea as long as defendant has
made a timely appeal of his conviction prior to his
deathxxii
California
Defendant’s death abates further proceedings of
the case but the appellate court may exercise its
discretion and hear the appealxxiii
Indiana
Abatement ab initio; arguably the court has left the
possibility of a different disposition if there is a
greater public interest at stakexxiv
Iowa
Abatement ab initio with the possibility of a
different disposition if there is a greater public
interest at stakexxv
Massachusetts
Abatement ab initio for direct appeals; refusal to
abate for subsequent appealsxxvi
Pennsylvania
Each time the court has addressed this issue it has
abated, but it has determined the merits of appeals
that were filed before the defendant’s deathxxvii
South Dakota
Abatement ab initio, but if the defendant was
guilty as a result of a plea and did not claim a “trial
court error or abuse of discretion in his judgment of
conviction” the conviction stands and the appeal
abatesxxviii
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Table 3
Jurisdictions that Currently Refuse to Abate
Jurisdiction
Special Rules
Fourth Circuit
There is no “litigable interest” to seek reversal of
the conviction; all penal judgments abate;
restitution orders do not automatically abatexxix
Georgia
When the appellant dies the appeal is dismissedxxx
Idaho
Conviction, and orders for payment of court costs,
fees, and restitution are upheld; orders for
incarceration are abatedxxxi
Michigan
Conviction is upheld; compensatory restitution may
be enforcedxxxii
Montana
Appeal is dismissed as mootxxxiii
New Hampshire
Appeal abatesxxxiv
North Carolina
Appeal abatesxxxv
Oklahoma
Appeal abatesxxxvi
Oregon
Appeal abates as per the State’s rules of appellate
procedurexxxvii
South Carolina
Appeal abates and substitution is explicitly not
permittedxxxviii
Texas
Appeal abates for lack of jurisdictionxxxix
Utah
Conviction does not abate; penal orders abate;
appeals regarding compensatory restitution orders
do not abatexl
Virginia
Appeal rendered mootxli
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Table 4
Jurisdictions that Currently Allow Substitutive Appeals
Jurisdiction
Special Rules
Alaska
The deceased’s estate may, within reasonable time,
move to proceed with the appeal; if no movement
for substitution is made, the conviction is upheldxlii
Florida
If the State or a representative of the defendant
shows “good cause” the appellate court may
determine that the appeal should be heardxliii
Hawaii
The appellate court has the discretion to hear a
substitutive appeal if a “proper party-defendant”
files a motion for substitution “within a reasonable
time after death” xliv
Kansas
The right to appeal is integral to the judicial
process so it must be permitted even after a
defendant’s death, especially if there is a greater
public interest at stakexlv
Maryland
If the defendant elected to appeal but died before
the final disposition of the appeal, the defendant’s
estate (and only his estate) may elect to pursue the
appeal so long as the substitution is made in a
timely mannerxlvi
Mississippi
State may file a motion to name a substitute as
party appellant; any party may make a timely
filing for substitutive appeal in the casexlvii
New Jersey
A defendant’s legal representative or other
collateral victim may pursue the appealxlviii
New Mexico
The appellate court has the discretion to appoint a
substitute in the appellate process where “(1) the
remaining parties have not tendered a motion for
substitution, (2) where the court determines that
continuing the appeal will not prejudice the rights
or interests of the deceased, and (3) where
concluding the appeal would be in the best
interests of the decedent’s estate, the remaining
parties, or society”xlix
Ohio
Either an appointed representative of the
decedent’s estate or the State may make a timely
motion for a substitutive appeal pursuant to the
State’s appellate rules of procedurel
Washington
Court is permitted to hear the merits of a criminal
appeal if “doing so is warranted”; court may abate
financial penalties that are owed to the government
if such penalties would risk “unfairly burdening the
defendant’s heirs”; restitution orders to victims do
not abateli
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Jurisdiction
Supreme Court of
the United States
First Circuit

Alabama

Connecticut

Kentucky

Minnesota
Wisconsin

i
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Table 5
Other Jurisdictionslii
Special Rules
Petitions for certiorari are dismissedliii
The circuit court has not adressed the issue but one
district court within the circuit has adopted
abatement ab initio and held that fines paid before
the defendant’s death must be returned to the
defendant’s estateliv
The appeal is abated and the appellate court must
“instruct the trial court to place in the record a
notation stating that the fact of the defendant’s
conviction removed the presumption of the
defendant’s innocence, but that the conviction was
appealed and it was neither affirmed nor reversed
on appeal because the defendant died while the
appeal of the conviction was pending and the
appeal was dismissed”lv
The court has never explicitly adopted a practice to
follow when a defendant dies while his appeal is
pending lvi
The court recognizes that the death of a defendant
renders a case moot as to that defendant but that
there could be other consequences to third parties;
in the most recent case presented to the court the
possibility of collateral consequences was strictly
academic and the court has refused to decide a
disposition regarding the hypothetical collateral
consequenceslvii
The state has not adopted the abatement
doctrinelviii
If defendant dies while pursuing an appeal the
appeal may be heardlix

See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1975).
iii
See United States v. Bowler, 537 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Ill 1982); United
States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977).
iv
United States v. Morton, 635 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1980).
v
United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2010).
vi
United States v. Rice, 303 Fed. Appx. 581, 582 (10th Cir. 2008).
vii
United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
viii
State v. Griffin, 592 P.2d 372, 373 (Ariz. 1979).
ii
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People v. Lipira, 621 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. 1980).
Howell v. U.S., 455 A.2d 1371, 1373 (D.C. 1983).
People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ill. 1999).
xii
State v. Thom, 438 So. 2d 208, 208 (La. 1983).
xiii
State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891, 895 (Me. 1973).
xiv
State v. West, 630 S.W.2d 271, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
xv
State v. Campbell, 193 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Neb. 1972).
xvi
People v. Craig, 585 N.E.2d 783, 788 (N.Y. 1991).
xvii
State v. Marzilli, 303 A.2d 367, 368 (R.I. 1973).
xviii
Carver v. State, 398 S.W.2d 719, 720-21 (Tenn. 1966).
xix
State v. Free, 260 P. 173, 173 (Wyo. 1927).
xx
United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1998).
xxi
U.S. v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 295 (3d. Cir. 2001).
xxii
United States v. Pogue, F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
xxiii
People v. Her, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 977, 978 n.1 (App. Ct. 2013). Here, the
defendant appealed his conviction but died before the disposition of the appeal. The
court held that a “[d]efendant’s death during the pendency of the appeal abates all
further proceedings of the case” but that the court was able to “exercise [its] inherent
authority to retain the appeal for issuance of [the] opinion since it raises important
issues of public interest that are likely to recur in other cases.” Id. The court remanded
the case to the trial court so that the record could reflect that all proceedings in the
case were permanently abated. Generally, California has practiced abatement ab initio.
See, e.g., People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 501 (2012). The fact that the Her
court entertained the appeal made it appear that the court was allowing the
substitution method, but the court’s decision to abate the case was solely based on the
defendant’s death, which is contrary to substitution.
xxiv
Kenner v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1361, 1362 (Ind. 1984).
xxv
Maghee v. State, 773 N.W.2d 228, 242 (Iowa 2009).
xxvi
Commonwealth v. De La Zerda, 619 N.E.2d 617, 619 (Mass. 1993).
xxvii
See generally Commonwealth v. Bizzaro, 535 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1987).
xxviii
State v. Hoxsie, 570 N.W.2d 379, 382 (1997).
xxix
United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 176 n.1, 178 (4th Cir. 1984).
xxx
Harris v. State, 194 S.E.2d 76, 77 (Ga. 1972).
xxxi
State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 135 (Idaho 2005).
xxxii
People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 161, 165 (Mich. 1995).
xxxiii
State v. Clark-Kotarski, 486 P.2d 876, 876 (Mont. 1971).
xxxiv
State v. Poulos, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (N.H. 1952).
xxxv
State v. Dixon, 144 S.E.2d 622, 622 (N.C. 1965).
xxxvi
See Johnson v. State, 392 P.2d 767, 767 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964).
xxxvii
See State v. Kaiser, 683 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Or. 1984).
xxxviii
State v. Anderson, 314 S.E.2d 597, 597 (S.C. 1984).
xxxix
State v. McCaffrey, 76 S.W.3d 392, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
xl
State v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah 1993).
xli
Abatement of Criminal Conviction; Effect of Death of Convicted Person
While Case on Appeal, Va. Code §19.2-8.2 (2012).
xlii
State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 766 (Alaska 2011).
xliii
State v. Clements, 668 So.2d 980, 982 (Fla. 1996).
xliv
State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw.), opinion after reinstatement of
appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995).
xlv
State v. Karson, 304 P.3d 317, 321 (Kan. 2013).
xlvi
Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1044-45 (Md. 2006).
xlvii
Gollot v. State, 646 So.2d 1297, 1304-05 (Miss. 1994).
xlviii
City of Newark v. Pulverman, 95 A.2d 889, 894 (N.J. 1953).
xlix
State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1003-04 (N.M. 1997).
l
State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1987).
li
State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 606 (Wash. 2006).
x

xi
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Arkansas, Deleware, Nevada, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia
have not addressed this issue. See Tim A. Thomas, Abatement of State Criminal Case
by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of Conviction—Modern Cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 189.
liii
Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1971). If an appeal of first
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